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Supervisor: Richard Dusansky 
 
In the first chapter, I investigate the welfare effect of the government subsidizing 
medical insurance. To that extent, I construct and simulate a partial equilibrium 
computational model of medical care consumption and choice of insurance contracts. I 
use the overall utility of agents as a welfare measure and find that it is not welfare 
improving to subsidize uninsured agents by taxing insured ones. In addition I use the 
framework to verify the insurance contract choice effect and find a strong insurance 
contract choice effect.  
 In Chapter 2, I investigate the effect of the price setting process under managed 
health care plans, such as HMOs and PPOs, on prices, profits of insurance companies and 
medical care providers, and household’s welfare compared to the indemnity plans 
prevalent before the advent of managed care. I construct a simple game played between a 
representative insurance company and a medical care provider to determine the price of 
medical care paid by insured and uninsured households. In addition, insurance companies 
set premiums not through solving the usual principal-agent problem which forces a zero 
profit condition, but rather and more realistically by optimizing profits. The outcome of 
 vii
this game is compared to the outcome of the indemnity plans where no price negotiations 
would occur.  
In Chapter 3, I investigate the effect of the suggested reform to the United States’ 
tax code in treatment of housing assets. In particular, I study the effect of the abolishment 
of the preferential tax treatment of housing assets (tax deductible mortgage interest 
payments and tax-free imputed rents) on the ownership and foreclosure rates in the 
housing market. I construct a model where heterogeneous agents decide on housing 
tenure in which default on housing mortgages occurs in equilibrium. I use this model to 
quantify the effect of this preferential tax treatment. I find that the elimination of the 
preferential tax treatment of housing assets results in a 33.4% reduction in foreclosures. 
Specifically, only eliminating the tax deductibility of interest on mortgage payments 
leads to a 12.4% reduction in foreclosure rates, while only taxing imputed rents generates 
a 32.5% reduction in foreclosure rates. 
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Chapter 1:  A Recursive Equilibrium Approach to Medical Care 
Demand and Insurance Choice 
1.1. Introduction 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was signed into United States law 
on March 23, 2010. This Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010 (signed into law on March 30, 2010) made up the health care reform of 2010. The 
Patient Protection Act is highly controversial, however, due to the rising cost of health 
care and the rising percentage of uninsured Americans, the need for reforming the 
medical care sector in the US is rarely in dispute. Thus, it is important to have a 
framework that allows us to analyze the benefits of reform to the medical care system. 
US Medical care expenditures have grown at an average rate of 8.9 percent since 
1980 while the gross domestic product average growth rate has been at about 6.3 percent 
over the same period. Medical care expenditure growing at a faster pace than the overall 
economy is observed in almost all the developed countries. In addition the cost for 
medical care has been steadily increasing. For example the total 2010 medical cost for a 
typical American family of four is $18,074 compared to the 2009 amount of $16,771, for 
an increase of 7.8 percent. This number represents an increase of 35.1 percent from the 
2006 number of $13,382.1 Increases of more than 8 percent have not been uncommon in 
previous years. 
                                                 
1 2010 and 2006 Milliman Medical Index 
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Given the increasing costs, access to insurance and how this access is provided to 
agents is an important aspect of any healthcare system discussion. This paper analyzes 
the welfare implications of subsidizing health insurance for uninsured individuals. To that 
purpose, I construct a dynamic model of insurance choice and medical care consumption 
where in equilibrium both insured and uninsured agents consume nondurables and 
medical services. Under uncertainty about income and health state, the model analyzes 
households’ choices of: (i) consumption of non-durable goods, (ii) savings, (iii) insurance 
plan, and (iv) consumption of medical care.  
Any attempt to study the welfare and demand implications of health care reform 
has to explicitly model both the agent’s insurance choice and medical care demand. This 
paper achieves that and I am not aware of a similar framework to analyze medical care 
and insurance demand under uncertainty. Dusansky and Koc (2006) introduced and 
analyzed insurance contract choice effect on elasticity of medical care demand by 
analyzing a one period two-stage model of insurance choice and medical care demand 
under uncertainty of health state. The recursive equilibrium model presented and 
computed in this paper can be considered to be a generalization of the one period two-
stage model used in Dusansky and Koc. The framework constructed in this paper will 
also be used to test the contract choice effect on elasticity of medical demand.  
In what follows, Section 1.2 presents the environment, Section 1.3 presents the 
model, agents’ behavior and describes the equilibrium, Section 1.4 presents the 




I present an environment where time is discrete and infinite. The economy is 
made up of households and a health insurance company. 
1.2.1. Households 
The economy is populated by a unit measure of infinitely lived households that 
derive utility from consuming a basket of non-durable goods:	(C) and health good:	(H). 
Thus, household’s utility function is given by	U(C, H).  
The health good is generated by consumption of medical services (M) using a 
linear transformation technology given by	H(M, S), where (S) is the individual’s health 
status.  
Agents maximize the sum of their expected utility E ∑ β U(C, H) Where 0 < < 1 is the discount factor. 
Every period, agents’ endowment (Y) and health state (S)	are revealed. 
Endowment and health state are assumed to be independent and follow a first order 
Markov processes. Households have access to capital markets via financial intermediaries 
where they can save or borrow (A) at discount rate	(q). Households also have access to 
health insurance provided by a health insurance company.2 They choose health insurance 
policy (R, σ) where R(σ)	is the insurance policy premium and	(σ) is their share of 
medical expenses.3 
                                                 
2 Ketcham et al (2011) show evidence that consumers are rational when choosing health insurance 
contracts. 
3 As in Feldstein (1971) were a single measure is assumed to fully describe an insurance policy.  
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Dardanoni and Wagstaff  (1990) discuss two types of uncertainty affecting the 
demand of medical care. Uncertainty about the occurrence of illness (what is referred to 
as type I uncertainty) and uncertainty about the effectiveness of treatment (type II 
uncertainty). In this paper, both types of uncertainty are being considered. Type I 
uncertainty is represented in the stochastic health state	(S), while type II uncertainty is 
taken into account by having the health production function	 (M, S) dependant on health 
state	(S), thus the amount of health good created from consumption of a given level of 
medical services (M) (i.e. the effectiveness of treatment”) varies by the health state.  
1.2.2. Health Insurance Providers 
Health insurance providers are assumed to be risk neutral agents that charge a 
premium (R) for providing insurance policy	(R, σ). This corresponds to the insurance 
provider paying (1 − σ) of insured agent medical expenses. This paper assumes that 
price of medical care is the same for both insured and uninsured agents.4 
Insurance providers have a zero profit condition where premium ( ) for a policy ( , ) is determined such that insurance providers break even on expectation. In 
determining R, insurance providers cannot discriminate based on household’s levels of 
income, health state, or savings.   
                                                 
4 Differences in prices faced by insured and uninsured agents is not within the scope of this chapter. I 
analyze the price setting process of medical care consumed by insured and uninsured agents in chapter II.  
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1.2.3. Transitions 
A household’s Income is assumed to be a one stage Markov process with 
transition matrix		Π ⁄ = Prob(Y = Y Y = Y⁄ ). Similarly, health state is assumed to 
be a one stage Markov process with transition matrix		Π ⁄ = Prob(S = S′ S = S⁄ ). 
1.2.4. Timing  
Every period is split into two stages.  
Stage 1 is characterized by the following events: 
• Household enters period with savings/borrowings (A) and she 
knows her health state (S ) from previous period; 
• Endowment (Y) is revealed; and 
• Household chooses insurance policy	(R, σ). 
Stage 2 is characterized by the following events: 
• Health state (S) is realized; and 
• Household chooses: current consumption of goods	(C), current 




1.3.1. Household’s Problem 
The household problem is formulated recursively. Given the above described 
environment, households solve a two step maximization problem. In the first stage, 
endowment ( ) is revealed while health state in previous period (S ) and savings (A) 
are already known by households. Households choose their insurance policy to maximize 
their future expected utility as of Stage 2 of current period.  V(Y, S , A) = 	max E ⁄ T(Y, S, σ)… . Stage	1 ∶ Insurance	Decision 
In Stage 2, after health state for the period (S) is realized, households decide on 
consumption of non-durable goods	(C), consumption of medical care	(M), and 
savings/borrowing for next period (A′) such as to maximize their future expected utility.  T(Y, S, A, σ) = 	 max, , E ⁄ U C, H(M, S)+ βE , ,⁄ V(Y′, S′, A′)… Stage	2: 	Consumption/Savings	Decisions s. t.					C + σM + A + R(σ) = q. A + Y 
Every period, the optimal decision functions are arrived to by backward induction. The 
agent solves the Stage 2 problem for every possible insurance plan ( ). Then, given the 
decision functions from Stage 2, and based on the agent’s expectation on the transition of 
health states, the insurance plan decision choice is made.  
The households’ decision functions are given by: 
• Insurance Decision: 	σ∗ = D (Y, S , A)  
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• Goods Consumption Decision: C∗ = D (Y, S, A, σ) 
• Medical Care Consumption Decision: M∗ = D (Y, S, A, σ) 
• Future Savings Decision: A ∗ = D (Y, S, A, σ) 
If an agent chooses not to be insured, that is represented with the following contract (0,1) where the agent pays no premium and pays the full share for her medical care 
consumption. 
1.3.2. Health Insurance Provider Problem 
As discussed above, the insurance provider cannot condition premiums on agent’s 
current income, health state, or savings. However, insurers can solve for the agent’s 
decision rules and thus can form expectations over agents’ Income, savings, and health 
states, to determine the premium,	R(σ), associated with a given cost share σ. The 
premium is determined such that the insurance provider’s expected profit is zero.  R(σ) = E , , (1 − σ)M(Y, S, σ, A) 
1.3.3. Recursive Equilibrium 
Having solved for the households and health insurance provider decision 
functions and pricing problems we can define the recursive equilibrium for the above 
economy as follows: 
The recursive equilibrium will be given by set of prices	q, R, value functions	V, T, 
decision rules on	σ = D (Y, S , A)	, C = D (Y, S, A, σ),M = D (Y, S, A, σ), A =	D (Y, S, A, σ), and by stationary distribution of agents Ω(Y, S, A , σ)such that:  
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1. Given prices, the Value functions V	and	T are the solution to the household’s 
optimization problem and σ = D (Y, S , A)	, C = D (Y, S, A, σ),M = D (Y, S, A, σ), A = 	D (Y, S, A, σ) are the 
corresponding decision rules; 
2. R satisfies health insurance providers zero profit condition 
3. q is such that borrowing markets clears 
4. Given the transition function χ(Y, S, A , σ) implied by the optimal decision rules and 
the stochastic processes for Y and S, the stationary distribution of agents Ω is given 
by: 
Ω(Y, S, A , σ) = χ(Y, S, A , σ)dΩ 
Appendix I explains the algorithm used in computing to the above equilibrium. 
1.4. Parameterization and Calibration 
1.4.1. Parameterization 
For the dynamics of the model (income and health processes), I use data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics survey (“PSID”). PSID Data is commonly used for 
income dynamics. To keep the source of exogenous states consistent (in this case Income 
and Health), I use the PSID for the health state dynamics as well. 
Income evolves according to a two state Markov process calibrated from PSID. 
For the income process, I use the following Y = 0.75	and	Yh = 1.25	where	Π ⁄ =
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0.76	and	Π ⁄ = 0.74 as in Akyol (2004) which is calibrated for a one year period. 
Other calibrations have been used in the literature, for example Imroholuglu (1992) 
calibrates the income process for a six week period to be given by Y = 0.25	and	Y =1	where	Π( ⁄ ) = 0.9565	and	Π( ⁄ ) = 0.5. 
I used the self-assessed health states of individuals from the PSID to construct the 
health state transition matrix of a three state Markov process (S 	, S , Sh) as follows: 
• Π ⁄ = 0.66	and	Π ⁄ = 0.24		 
• Π ⁄ = 0.14	and	Π ⁄ = 0.51		 
• Π ⁄ = 0.03	and	Π ⁄ = 0.17		 
I use the following functional form of the period utility: U(C, H) = C 1 − η⁄ +ψH(M, S) 1 − η⁄  where utility is separable in consumption of the non-durable good C 
and medical services	M. The health production function is given by H(M, S) = ζM − Θ  
where Θ  is dependent on health state	(S).5 This implies a health state dependent utility of 
the form: U(C,M, S) = C 1 − η⁄ + ψ(ζM − Θ ) 1 − η⁄ .  
This functional form of the utility function assumes no second order interaction between 
non-durable goods consumption, health state, and medical care consumption. By 
choosing this functional form, I am sacrificing any second order interactions that may 
occur between non-durable consumption and medical care consumption for the benefit of 
a traceable equilibrium. 
                                                 
5 Θ 	dependence on health state is the Type II uncertainty discussed in section 1.2 above 
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1.4.2. Calibration Θ , ζ, and	ψ	are jointly calibrated such that the output of the model matches the 
out of pocket expenditure of agents by health state, total expenditure on health care as a 
percentage of GDP, and percentage of uninsured agent. Out of pocket expenditures by 
health state are calculated from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, The ratio of total 
expenditure on health care to GDP is calculated from the National Health Expenditure 
Survey. All of the targeted ratios were calculated as of 2007.  
The results of the calibration were as follows 





 Weight of utility derived from health generated by medical 
consumption 
9.68 
Table 1: Results of Calibration 
For the discount factor	β, I use a value of 0.96 for a one year period.  
                                                 
6 In Section 1.6.2, I test the sensitivity of my results when this parameter is perturbed.  
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1.5. Results 
In this section, I present the results of the computation of the recursive 
equilibrium. In specific, the dynamics of agent’s choices on medical consumption and 
insurance are discussed in detail. 
1.5.1. Medical services consumption 
Figure 1 below plots an agent’s medical services consumption as a function of 
savings for agents with low and high levels of income. The plot shows that two agents 
with the same health state and wealth will differ in their consumption of medical services 
based on the level of their current income. The agent with higher income will consume 
more of the medical good. In addition, it is no surprise that medical consumption is 





Figure 1: Medical services consumption as a function of savings and income 
 
Figure 2 shows an agent’s medical consumption as a function of savings for 
healthy and unhealthy agents. The plot shows that two agents with the same income level 
and wealth will differ in their consumption of the medical healthcare good based on their 
health state. The healthy agent will consume less of the medical good than the unhealthy 
one. 
The fact that medical consumption is increasing in wealth level and income level 
is not surprising, this result is expected given the construction of the utility function in the 
model where agent’s utility is increasing in consumption of the medical good. 
Consumption of the medical good being decreasing in the health level is an output of the 
model independent of the modeling choices per se. This intuitive result should be 
expected after examining the result of the calibration exercise to determine	Θ 	. 


























Specifically since Θ  is decreasing in health level, which means that a healthy agent 
consuming an amount x	of the health good will receive a higher level of health services H(x, 3) than an unhealthy agent who will receive	H(x, 1).  
 
Figure 2: Medical services consumption as a function of savings and health 
1.5.2. Insurance Choice 
Figure 3 below plots an agent’s insurance choice as a function of savings for 
agents with low and high levels of income. The plot shows that two agents with the same 
health state and wealth level will differ in their choice of insurance based on the level of 
their current income. The agent with high income will decide to purchase insurance at a 
lower wealth level than agents with low income.  



























Figure 3: Insurance choice as a function of savings and income 
Figure 4 shows an agent’s insurance choice as a function of savings for healthy 
and unhealthy agents. The plot shows that two agents with the same income level and 
wealth will differ in their insurance decision based on their health state. An agent who 
has been unhealthy in the previous period will choose to buy insurance at a lower wealth 
level compared to an agent who was healthy in the previous period.  
The above described dynamics of insurance choice with respect to wealth, 
savings, and health match the dynamics of medical care demand. Agents consuming more 
of the medical good when their wealth or savings increase or when their health 
deteriorates are expected to purchase more insurance as well. 





























Figure 4: Insurance choice as a function of savings and health 
1.6. Policy Evaluation  
1.6.1. Subsidizing Insurance 
In this section I study the effect of subsidizing the cost of insurance for uninsured 
agents. For this purpose I introduce a government into the economy that taxes insured 
agents to collect funds that it uses to subsidize insurance policies for uninsured agents. 
The government is assumed to run a balanced budget. The level of subsidized insurance 
(i.e. the cost share that previously uninsured agents will have to pay once their insurance 
is subsidized) could vary, and some of the results in this section depend on this 




























parameter. I model the tax on insured agents as a tax on insurance premiums that agents 
have to pay in order to obtain insurance.7 
The tax and subsequent subsidy affect the insurance choice decision of self-
insured agents as well as the consumption and saving decisions of both self-insured and 
uninsured agents. In assessing the effect of the subsidy, I re-compute the equilibrium 
described in section 3.3 above such that self-insured agents remain insured8 and 
uninsured agents receive subsidized insurance from the government. This constraint 
follows from the fact that for the government to properly implement the subsidy, it is 
necessary that agents who would normally purchase insurance (i.e., self-insured agents) 
are not allowed to go uninsured in order to benefit from the subsidy. All other decisions 
are re-computed at equilibrium.  
Welfare in the economy decreases regardless of the level of subsidized insurance.9 
The subsidy affects the welfare of self-insured and uninsured agents differently. The 
welfare of self-insured agents will decrease due to the increase in premiums which 
reduces the agent’s disposable income available for savings and consumption (of both 
non-durable and health goods). Uninsured agents will experience an increase in welfare 
due to the lower cost they face in consuming the medical services.10 This overall 
                                                 
7 How this tax is levied shouldn’t affect the results arrived to in this section. Taxing insurance premiums is 
a tractable approach to ensure that only insured agents are paying the tax subsidy.  
8 The level of insurance is allowed to vary just as in the baseline equilibrium case. 
9 I use the sum of utility of all agents at equilibrium as the measure of welfare. 
10 Due to the moral hazard effect of insurance and keeping income, health state, and savings constant 
previously uninsured agents will consume more medical services now that they are insured. 
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reduction in welfare is partly due to the fact that the majority of agents in this economy, 
about 85 percent, are self-insured.11  
Given that part of the debate around the healthcare system is controlling the 
systemic increase in cost of healthcare over the past two decades, it is insightful to test 
the effect of the subsidy on the overall demand for medical care in the economy. As 
described above, the effect of the subsidy is a decrease in the amount of medical care 
consumed by self-insured agents and an increase in the amount of medical care consumed 
by previously uninsured agents. The relative strength of these two effects determines the 
overall response of total medical care demand in the economy. In turn, the strength of 
these two responses is a direct consequence of the level of cost share of the subsidized 
insurance plan. A low level of subsidized cost share means higher taxes on the self-
insured and thus a larger decrease in consumption of medical care by this group while on 
the flip side, a low level of subsidized cost share also means a stronger moral hazard 
effect for the uninsured and thus a larger increase in the demand of this group. 
1.6.2. Demand Response to Price Change 
We can use the above framework to analyze the contract choice effect on demand 
of Medical Care. This effect was first analyzed by Dusansky and Koc (2006) where they 
derived conditions affecting price elasticity of medical care demand for a single agent 
with stochastic health state. The setup in this paper allows us to analyze the contract 
                                                 
11 Of course, subsidizing health insurance for the poor, or any other measure with a similar goal of helping 
low income agents gain access to medical care is associated with a social responsibility that is difficult to 
measure in terms of utility functions and welfare measures. 
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choice effect on an economy wide basis. In addition, given that this paper actually 
computes insurance choice decisions based on a finite set of insurance contracts,  
switching over contracts may not be possible (for example an agent that is already 
choosing the insurance contract with the lowest cost share available). So some agents 
may not exhibit a change in their insurance choice as a response to a price change.  
The above economy shows a positive elasticity of 0.095 for medical care demand. 
As described in Dusansky and Koc, a positive elasticity of medical care demand is 
possible when insurance demand is elastic.12 I calculate an elasticity of 1.114 for 
Insurance demand.13 As Dusansky and Koc note, Feldstein’s (1971) estimates a 
statistically significant insurance demand elasticity of 1.2 when analyzing changes in 
prices of hospital care.  
The dynamics leading to such a result are explained in detail in Dusansky and 
Koc (2006) but are worth repeating briefly here. When the price of medical care changes 
agents respond not only by changing their demand (the neo-classical response) but by 
adjusting their insurance choices as well. An agent’s response to an increase in the price 
of medical care when insurance choice is kept constant is the neo-classical decrease in 
demand. Contract choice effect arises when an agent is allowed to adjust her choice of 
insurance contract. Dusansky and Koc show that a necessary condition for medical care 
being elastic is that the contract choice effect be positive and strong. That is an agent 
decreases her cost share (purchases “more” insurance) as a response to an increase in 
                                                 
12 Equation 7 in Dusansky and Koc (2006) 
13 A sensitivity analysis was performed on the resultant elasticity due to changing 	, the health production 
function medical consumption coefficient. Using a  of 8.84 instead of 7.94 which is a change of 10 
percent will yield a medical demand elasticity of 0.14 and an insurance demand elasticity of 1.5.  
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price, the more generous insurance plan allows her to purchase more medical care which 
offsets the effect of the neo-classical response. An aspect not explicitly discussed by 
Dusansky and Koc is that insurance premiums also change in response to a change in the 
price of medical care. An increase in price will lead to an increase in premiums. The 
positive elasticity of 0.095 reported here takes this effect into consideration. Thus agents 
choose to increase their demand for insurance despite the increase in premiums observed 
when medical care prices increase.  
It is worth noting here that the response of insurance demand when premiums 
increase due to an increase in the price of medical care (an increase in insurance demand 
in this case) is different from the response of insurance demand when premiums increase 
with medical care prices being constant (such as when a tax levied on insurance 
premiums as in section 6.1 above). In the latter case, demand for insurance is decreasing 
in premiums.  
1.7. Conclusion 
I describe and compute a dynamic equilibrium model of insurance choice, 
medical care consumption, non-durable goods consumption, and savings to estimate the 
effect of suggested medical care reform. One of these reforms is subsidizing medical care 
insurance for uninsured agents. Such a policy shows a decrease in the total welfare of the 
economy. The effect on medical care demand as a whole, which is essential in terms of 
effect of this policy on cost of medical care depends on the level of subsidized insurance. 
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In addition the computed economy displays a positive elasticity of medical care demand 




2. Chapter 2: Insurance Regime and Price Formation  
2.1. Introduction 
  I investigate the effect of the price setting process under managed health care 
plans, such as HMOs and PPOs, on prices, profits of insurance companies and medical 
care providers, and household’s welfare compared to the indemnity plans prevalent 
before the advent of managed care. I construct a simple game played between a 
representative insurance company and a medical care provider to determine the price of 
medical care paid by insured and uninsured households. In addition, insurance companies 
set premiums not through solving the usual principal-agent problem which forces a zero 
profit condition, but rather and more realistically by optimizing profits. The outcome of 
this game is compared to the outcome of the indemnity plans where no price negotiations 
would occur.14   
2.2. Environment 
I build a one period economy populated by consumers, a medical insurance 
company, and a medical care provider that interact to determine demand, supply, and 
price(s) of medical care. 
2.2.1. Consumers 
Consumers in this economy differ by their level of income. A consumer can be a 
“high” type with income (w ) or a “low” type with income	(w ). Whether a consumer is 
                                                 
14 Under indemnity plans, insurance companies paid a percentage share of the Usual, Customary and 
Reasonable “UCR” price. The UCR price was determined as the price charged by a certain percentage of 
care providers. 
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high or low type is private information unavailable to the medical insurance company or 
to the medical care provider.  
Consumers solve a single period two-stage planning problem. In the first stage, a 
consumer knows her income type but not her health state and makes a choice on her 
insurance plan. In the second stage, after the health state is revealed, she decides on the 
consumption of the non-durable and medical care goods.15 I restrict the choice of 
insurance plan to whether the consumer purchases insurance or chooses to be uninsured. 
This assumption will not affect the results of this paper, since my conclusions are 
independent of the specifics of the insurance contract purchased. Thus going forward, an 
insured agent is assumed to purchase a representative insurance contract	(R(σ), σ). (R) is 
the premium and (σ) is the share of medical expenses paid by the insured consumer. 
Consumers get sick with probability	(γ). If a consumer is sick, she gets utility 
from consumption of medical care	(Q) in the second stage of the period. A healthy 
consumer gets no utility out of consumption of medical care and thus will demand zero (Q). 16 In addition, all consumers get utility from consumption of a non-durable good	(C). 
If we let (S) denote the agent’s health state with a value of 1 when agent is sick, then an 
agent’s second stage utility is given by: U(C, Q) = 	Z(C) +	(S = 1). A. V(Q) 
                                                 
15 This set up of the one period two stage problem is similar to the setup used by Dusansky and Koc 
(2006).  
16 This simplifying assumption is both factual and non restrictive. The results of this paper should apply if 
we assume agents demand a certain level of medical care when healthy. 
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In the above, I have assumed utility to be separable in the consumption of non-
durable and medical care goods. This simplification allows for a more traceable analysis 
at the expense of not capturing second order interactions between non-durables 
consumption and medical care consumption. (A)	is a positive constant that represents the 
weight of utility derived from medical care in the agent’s overall utility. Both Z(∙) and V(∙) are assumed to be continuous, bounded and concave. Since consumers in this 
economy live for only one period, they will exhaust all of their income on consumption. 
The consumer’s second stage budget constraint will depend on the type, health 
state, as well as the insurance choice from stage 1 and given as follows. w / − (S = 1). 	P Q , / −	C , / = 0																Uninsured w / − R − (S = 1). 	σPQ , / −	C , / = 0,														Insured 
Where: w 	and	w 	denote the income for high and low types respectively;  C , 	and	C ,  denote the consumption of the non-durable good by insured high and 
low types respectively; C , 	and	C ,  denote the consumption of the non-durable good by uninsured 
high and low types respectively; Q , 	and	Q ,  denote the consumption of medical care by insured high and low 
types respectively; Q , 	and	Q ,  denote the demand for medical care by uninsured high and low 
types respectively; 
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P  is the price of medical care faced by uninsured agents; P  is the price of medical care faced by insured agents; 
In the above, I allow for the medical care price faced by the consumer to be 
different for insured and uninsured consumers to account for the characteristics of 
managed health care. These prices are known to all consumers at the beginning of the 
period. 
We can now solve for the consumer’s decision functions in the different states of 
stage 2. A high type insured consumer’s demand of medical care Q ,  solves the problem Max	U(C, Q) = 	Z(C) +	(S = 1). A. V(Q) 	s. t. w − R −	(S = 1). σPQ − 	C = 0 
Thus medical care demand in this case is a function of income after payment of 
insurance contract and price of medical care and expressed as	Q , (w − R, σP ). The 
demand for medical care is zero is agent is healthy (i.e.	S = 0). Similarly a medical care 
demand for a low type insured Q ,  agent is given by Q , (w − R, σP ). 
A high type uninsured consumer’s demand for medical care Q ,  solves the 
problem  Max	U(C, Q) = 	Z(C) +	(S = 1). A. V(Q) 	s. t. w −	(S = 1). P Q − 	C = 0 
Thus medical care demand in this case is a function of income and price of 
medical care and expressed as	Q , (w , P ). Similarly, medical care demand for a low 
type uninsured consumer is given by	Q , (w , P ). 
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Given the utility functions and budget constraints it is straight forward to show 
that all individual demand functions are increasing in residual wealth and decreasing in 
price of medical care. 
A high type consumer will purchase the representative insurance contract (R(σ), σ) if being insured will lead to a higher expected utility than being uninsured, i.e. 
if EU ≥ EU and similarly a low type consumer will purchase insurance if	EU ≥EU . Where we can express the expected utilities as follows: EU , = (γ). U C , , , Q , + 	(1 − γ). U C , , , 0 ⋯⋯⋯(1) EU , = (γ). U C , , , Q , + 	(1 − γ). U C , , , 0 ⋯⋯⋯(2) EU , = (γ). U C , , , Q , +	(1 − γ). U C , , , 0 ⋯⋯⋯(3) EU , = (γ). U C , , , Q , + 	(1 − γ). U C , , , 0 ⋯⋯⋯(4) 
2.2.2. Medical Care Provider 
The medical care provider in this economy maximizes his profit (π ) by setting 
prices for providing medical care for consumers. Thus price of medical care solves the 
general problem Max	 π = γ PQ − ψ(Q)  
Where ψ(∙) is the medical provider’s cost function and γ is the probability of 
agents getting sick. The specifics of determining the provider’s profit function and thus 
the prices of medical care will differ depending on the insurance regime being 
considered. I solve for the care provider’s problem in detail after specifying the different 
insurance regimes in section 2.2 below. 
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2.2.3. Insurance Provider 
Insurance provider offers the consumer a representative insurance contract (R, σ) 
discussed above where (R) is the premium and (σ) is the share of medical expenses paid 
by the insured.  
The insurance provider is a profit maximizing entity where for a given cost share ( ),	premium	 ( ) is determined such that profit Π = R − . (1 − ).  is 
maximized.  
2.3. Insurance Regimes and Equilibrium  
I solve the above economy for both the indemnity and managed care regimes and 
compare the outcomes in terms of prices, profitability of insurance and care providers and 
consumers’ welfare.  
Under an indemnity plan, Insurance companies pay (1 − σ)	of price of medical 
care set by medical care providers without negotiating a price for the insured. That is 
there is a single price (P) for medical care that the provider receives in return for its 
services.  
Under managed care, Insurance companies offer care providers what amounts to a 
take it or leave price P  when serving an insured patient. The patient pays her cost share, σ, of said price while insurance pays the remainder. In addition, doctors are free to set 
their price for providing services to uninsured agents	P .  
I solve for a separating equilibrium in this economy where the insurance provider 
sets prices such that in equilibrium all high type agents are insured and all low type 
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agents are uninsured. In 2004 two-thirds of the uninsured in the U.S. were low-income 
individuals or came from low-income families.17 A separating equilibrium where low 
type agents are uninsured will capture this fact. In addition, uninsured agents face prices 
that are different from insured agents, and a separating equilibrium also allows for this 
fact in the model. 
2.3.1. Indemnity  
A separating equilibrium in the indemnity regime is given by price for medical 
care	P, a representative insurance contract (R, σ), and demand for medical care (Q , Q ) 
where: 
• Taking prices as given, high type consumers are insured while low type 
consumers are uninsured; 
• Taking prices as given, agents demand Q , , Q ,  of  medical care to 
maximize their utility; 
• Insurance provider decides R	 for the representative insurance plan; and 
• Medical Care provider decides P. 
Under the separating equilibrium described above, high type consumers will 
purchase insurance and demand	Q , (w − R, σP) in medical care in stage 2 while low 
type consumers will be uninsured and demand	Q , (w , P) in stage 2. 
                                                 
17 The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2006 Report.  
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Q , (∙,∙) and Q , (∙,∙) have the characteristics described in section 1 above , that 
is both functions are increasing in income , decreasing in premium (applicable only for 
insured agent’s demand) , and decreasing in price of medical care. 
The care provider sets price P to maximize its profit, thus P is the solution to the 
following problem Max 	π = 	Max γ. P τQ , + (1 − τ)Q , −ψ τQ , + (1 − τ)Q ,   ψ(∙)	is the medical care provider’s cost function and τ is the proportion of high 
type agents in the economy. Where I assume that the cost function is such that	ψ τQ , +(1 − τ)Q , = τ∅ Q , + (1 − τ)∅ Q , .18  
Now the provider’s problem is given by:  Max γ. τ P Q , − ∅ Q , +	γ. (1 − τ) P Q , − ∅ Q ,  
 
Where in the above, γ. τ P Q , − ∅ Q ,  is the provider’s profit from 
insured patients, while  γ. (1 − τ) P Q , − ∅ Q ,  is the providers profit 
from uninsured patients. The first order condition (F.O.C.) for the medical care provider 
is given by: 
                                                 
18 This assumption is reasonable for medical procedures that don’t considerably vary across individuals. 
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Q , +	P ∂Q ,∂P − ∂∅∂Q , ∂Q ,∂P
+	(1 − τ) Q , +	P ∂Q ,∂P − ∂∅∂Q , ∂Q ,∂P= 0						 ⋯⋯⋯(5) 
The insurance provider takes the price P  set by the medical provider as 
given and determines premium R  to maximize profits Π  by solving  Max 	Π  
                    s. t. EU ≥ EU 	⋯⋯⋯(IC − 1) EU ≥ EU ⋯⋯⋯(IC − 2) (IC − 1) is the incentive compatibility constraint for the high types stating that 
insurance provider will set premium R  such that high types will always choose 
to be insured. Similarly, equation (IC − 2) is the incentive compatibility constraint for 
the low types stating that premium R  is such that low types will always choose 
to be uninsured. I assume that the incentive compatibility for the low type is satisfied by 
the selection of a low enough w  as income for the low type consumer. Thus moving 
forward, I drop IC − 2 from the solution describing the separating equilibrium.  
We can re-write the insurance problem as follows: Max 	R − 	γ	Q , . (1 − σ) P  s. t. (γ). U C , , , Q , + 	(1 − γ). U C , , , 0≥ (γ). U C , , , Q , + 	(1 − γ). U C , , , 0 ⋯ (IC − 1) 
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Where I substituted for EU &	EU  from equations	(1)	&	(2) above.  
Proposition 1: Under an indemnity regime, insurance premium  is such 
that the expected utility of an insured agent is equal to the expected utility of an 
uninsured agent  = 	⋯⋯⋯(6) 
Proof: Appendix II IC − 1 is binding because the insurance provider’s profit is increasing in the 
premium R , the left hand side of IC − 1 is decreasing in R while the right hand 
side of IC − 1 is independent of R . Remembering that the insurance provider in 
this economy is a profit maximizing entity, this result makes sense allowing the insurance 
provider to extract as much premium as possible from the insured. 
2.3.2. Managed Care 
A separating equilibrium in the managed care regime is given by prices for 
medical care	P 	,P , representative insurance contract (R , σ), and demand for 
medical care (Q , Q ) where: 
• Taking prices as given, high type consumers are insured while low type 
agents are uninsured; 
• Taking prices as given, consumers demand Q , , Q ,  of  medical care to 
maximize their utility; 
• Insurance provider decides on R 	and P  to maximize profits Π  
; and 
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• Medical Care provider decides P  to maximize Π  
Under the separating equilibrium described above, high type consumers will 
purchase insurance and demand	Q , (w − R , σP ) in medical care in stage 2 while 
low type consumers will be uninsured and demand	Q , (w , P 	) in stage 2. Q , (∙,∙) and Q , (∙,∙) have the characteristics described in section 1 above , that 
is increasing in income, decreasing in premium (applicable only for insured agent’s 
demand), and decreasing in price of medical care. 
Care providers set price of medical services for uninsured consumers to maximize 
profit	Π . That is P  is the solution to  Max( )Π = Max( )γ	(1 − τ) P . Q , − ∅ Q ,  
The F.O.C. of the care provider’s problem is given by 
(1 − τ) Q , +	P ∂Q ,∂P − ∂∅∂Q , ∂Q ,∂P = 0	⋯⋯⋯(7) 
Note here that the care provider does not set the price for insured 
customers,	P , as that is set by the insurance provider. I assume that if P  is such 
that the care provider is indifferent between providing and not providing services, the 
care provider will choose to provide said services. 
As in the indemnity case, insurance provider maximizes profits	Π  . 
However, under managed care, in addition to setting the premiums paid by insured 
consumers for the insurance contract	(R , σ) , the insurance provider sets the price 
received by medical providers P  for services provided to insured agents.  
The insurance provider’s problem is given by  
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Max 	Π  s. t. EU ≥ EU 	⋯⋯⋯(IC − 3) EU ≥ EU 									⋯⋯⋯(IC − 4) Π ≥ 0				⋯⋯⋯(IC − 5) IC − 3	and IC − 4 are similar conditions to IC − 1 and IC − 2 in the case of 
indemnity insuring that high type customers will choose to purchase insurance while low 
type customers will choose to be uninsured. As in the indemnity case, I assume that IC − 4 is satisfied by choice of w  and is dropped from the description of the 
equilibrium. IC − 5 is unique to the managed care scenario and it states that the medical care 
provider will have non-negative profits from serving insured customers. This condition is 
needed to insure the care provider’s participation in the managed care system. Incentive 
compatibility constraints under managed care are constraints on the pair of prices 
determined by the insurance provider (P , R ) which adds complexity to 
determining the outcome of the equilibrium.  
Using the definition of the care provider’s profit form insured agents as well as 
equations (1)	&	(2), we can re-write the insurance providers problem as follows: 
 Max , 	Π = Max , 	R − 	γ	Q 	(1 − σ)(P ). s. t. (γ). U C , , , Q , + 	(1 − γ). U C , , , 0≥ (γ). U C , , , Q , + 	(1 − γ). U C , , , 0 ⋯ (IC − 3) 
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and (τ) P Q , − ∅ Q , ≥ 0⋯ (IC − 5) 
 
Proposition 2: − 3 is binding if demand is elastic or if demand is inelastic and 
is larger than marginal cost. i.e. = ⋯⋯⋯(8) 	 , < −1		⋯⋯⋯ 	(1) 
	 	 , 	 ≥ −1	&	 < ∅ 	⋯⋯⋯ 	(2) 
Proof: Appendix II 
2.4. Comparison of Regimes In	 comparing	 the	 Indemnity	 and	 Managed	 Care	 regimes,	 and	 under	 the	separating	equilibrium,	 the	percentage	of	 insured	and	uninsured	customers	 is	 the	same	regardless	of	 the	 regime	given	 that	 it	 is	 controlled	by	 the	percentage	of	 low	and	high	type	consumers	in	the	economy.	Also,	the	comparisons	have	to	be	made	for	the	same	cost	share	in	the	insurance	contract.	
2.4.1. Medical care prices 
Proposition 3: Under Managed Care, uninsured agents pay more for medical 
care,	 ≥ , when compared to the Indemnity regime if the elasticity of 
demand is such that	ε , ≤ ∅, , − 1… . ( 	3) 
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Proof: Appendix II 
Since  
∅, , < 0 Proposition 3 states that for P ≥ P  to 
hold, demand for medical care needs to be highly elastic. If condition 3 does not hold, 
uninsured agents pay less under managed care than under indemnity. 
2.4.2. Agents’ welfare 
It is easy to see that condition 2 and condition 3 cannot be satisfied at the same 
time, while condition 3 holding implies that condition 1 holds as well. 
Proposition 4: If condition 3 holds, welfare declines for both insured and 
uninsured agents under the Managed Care regime when compared to the Indemnity 
regime. Alternatively if condition 2 holds welfare under managed care is larger than 
welfare under indemnity for insured and uninsured agents. 
Proof:  
If condition 3 holds then the following is true: 
1- Under the Indemnity regime, IC-1 binds and equation 6 states that = . Note here that equation 6 is satisfied 
regardless of condition 3 holding. 
2- Under the Managed care regime, IC-3 binds and equation 8 states that EU = EU  
3- Price paid by uninsured agents under managed care is greater than or equal to 
the price paid by agents under indemnity, i.e. ≥  
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Using equation 2, the off equilibrium path expected utility of high type uninsured 
agents is given by: EU , = (γ). U C , , , Q , + 	(1 − γ). U C , , , 0 ⋯⋯⋯(2) 
Equation 2 is independent of the insurance premium and dependant on only the 
price paid for medical care by the uninsured agent P . It is straightforward to prove that 
,  is negative and since P ≥ P we get that  EU ≤ EU ⋯⋯⋯(9) 
That is the off the equilibrium path expected utility of uninsured high types is 
lower under managed care than under indemnity. However, since IC-1 and IC-3 bind as 
stated above, we get that  EU ≤ EU ⋯⋯⋯(10) 
That is the expected utility of insured agents is lower under managed care than 
under indemnity. 
If on the other hand Condition 2 holds, it is easy to show in the same manner as 
above that:  EU ≥ EU ⋯⋯⋯(11) 
As for uninsured agents in equilibrium, their expected utility is given by equation 
4 as EU , = (γ). U C , , , Q , + 	(1 − γ). U C , , , 0  
  
It is straightforward to show that ,  is negative and given that  
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≥  under condition 3 it is straightforward to show that  EU ≤ EU ⋯⋯⋯(12) 
and given that ≤  under condition 2 we will have,  
 EU ≥ EU ⋯⋯⋯(13) ∎ 
Most research indicates that demand for medical care is inelastic which falls 
under the requirements of Condition 2. Even though we cannot show that Condition 2 
holds without investigation of the care provider’s cost function, the fact that demand for 
medical care is inelastic excludes Condition 3 from holding which would steer us away 
from concluding that managed care reduces consumer’s welfare. On the other hand, if it 
is the case that demand for a specific type of medical care is elastic, say preventive care, 
that would lead us to conclude that for these specific services, the managed care regime 
reduces the agent’s welfare.  
Also, we can show that under managed care the profit of the care provider is 
reduced since the insurance provider holds more bargaining power by setting the price 
paid by insured agents. Indeed, Appendix II shows that when demand for medical care is 
inelastic, the insurance provider’s profit function is inversely related to the price of 
medical services, and as thus the insurance provider is incentivized to reduce the price it 
offers medical care providers. In fact when demand for medical care in inelastic IC-5 will 
always bind and thus the care provider will not earn any profits from serving insured 
agents. Even though this paragraph states that the insurance provider is getting more 
profit under Managed Care than under Indemnity, it does not mean that the premiums are 
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necessary higher under managed care. The proper way to interpret the insurance 
provider’s increased profit is that under Managed Care, the price pair (R , P ) is 
such that the insurance provider profit is larger than that under indemnity. 
A full list of the outcomes based on the interaction between the elasticity of 
medical care demand and the provider’s cost function is in table A1 in Appendix II.  
2.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I construct a three agent economy where the prices of medical care 
and insurance are set in equilibrium. I assume a separating equilibrium where high type 
agents are insured while low type agents are not. Without assuming specific functional 
forms for utilities, profit, and cost functions, I derive conditions to compare the indemnity 
and managed care insurance regimes. Under my framework above, it seems to be the case 
that for inelastic medical services, managed care provides a welfare benefit for the agents 






3. Chapter 3:  Effect of Housing Tax Regime on Mortgage Default Rates 
3.1. Introduction 
The subprime mortgage crisis, indications of which could have been detected as 
early as 2007, put the U.S. economy into the worst recession since the Great Depression 
and caused a domino effect that threatened to bring down the global financial system. 
Various explanations have been given as reasons for the crisis including: lax 
borrowing constraints (subprime mortgages, adjustable rate mortgages, low down 
payment requirements, etc…), lack of regulation and oversight, and lack of understanding 
of the complex financial assets built around subprime mortgages. No doubt the recent 
crisis can be linked to the above mentioned reasons. However, a fundamental factor that 
contributed to the crisis is the housing asset price bubble which led to the over 
accumulation of housing assets. Preferential tax treatment of housing assets makes 
owning a house more attractive than renting which contributes to the over accumulation 
of housing assets.  
Indeed, housing assets receive preferential tax treatment in the U.S. compared to 
capital. Specifically, interest on mortgage payments is tax deductible and imputed rents 
from owner occupied housing are not taxed. The literature on optimal capital and housing 
taxation suggests that it is welfare improving to eliminate the preferential tax treatment 
that house owners receive. However, the question of the effect of said preferential 
treatment on foreclosure had not been investigated. Given that the subprime mortgage 
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crisis was manifested by homeowners defaulting on their mortgages, this is an important 
avenue to investigate. 
To estimate this effect, I construct and compute an economy where agents value 
both housing services and consumption. Agents can choose to either rent or buy their 
housing services. Homeowners enter into simple mortgages with a financial intermediary, 
where every period they choose to either make payments on or default. Government 
expenditure is exogenous every period and the government has no access to lump sum 
taxes, thus it uses distortionary taxes to levy income. 
On the housing side of the literature, optimal housing taxation has been 
investigated, and as stated above the prevailing conclusion is that all types of households 
prefer to be in a world where housing is taxed in a similar fashion to capital. 
Nakajima(2007) builds an overlapping generation model with un-insurable idiosyncratic 
shocks to individual earnings  where agents age stochastically and renting is not an 
option. He then analyzes the interaction between housing and financial assets, and 
determines optimal taxes on housing. Gervais (2002) also constructs a similar model but 
without intra-generational heterogeneity. Some other papers have infinitely lived agents 
as in Diaz and Luengo-Prado(2006). 
It is important to note here that while the above described literature is relevant to 
this paper’s question, what I attempt to answer here is not the welfare implications of tax 
reform but rather the effect of the current tax structure on foreclosures in the housing 
markets. Also worth noting is that this chapter is concerned only with agents housing 
tenure choices and consumption patterns.  
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In what follows, Section 2 presents the environment, Section 3 presents the 
model, agents’ behavior and describes the equilibrium, Section 4 presents the 
parameterization and calibration process and Section 5 presents the results. 
3.2. Environment 
I present an environment where time is discrete and infinite. The economy is 
populated by households, a production firm, a financial intermediary, and a government. 
3.2.1. Households 
The economy is populated by a unit measure of infinitely lived households that 
derive utility from consuming a basket of non-durable goods:	( ) and housing services: (ℎ). Thus, household’s utility function is given by: ( , ℎ). A transformation technology 
exists between house size and housing service. Living in a house of size ( )	will generate 
housing services ℎ = ( ). Agents maximize the sum of their expected utility E ∑ β U(c, h)∞  where 0 < < 1 is the discount factor. 
Agents have an endowment of one unit of time every period and supply labor in-
elastically. However, households differ in their productivity, z, which is stochastic and 
assumed to follow a first order Markov process. Households can invest in capital: ( )	and 
earn a return on capital	( ). 
  Households can either rent or buy housing. When agents rent, they simply pay 
rent. When they own a house of size	( ), they enter into a simple mortgage with the 
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financial intermediary and borrow	(1 − ) . Thus  is the down payment requirement.19 
Households pay their mortgage over a period of 30 years. At any time during this 30 yeas 
period, agents can default on their mortgage, and they will lose their owned house and 
will be forced to rent. Owners who default on their mortgage are allowed to own a house 
after a period of seven years which matches the duration of the period for which credit 
bureaus keep records on defaults. Owners are not allowed to buy another house before 
the end of the 30 mortgage period. 
3.2.2. Production Firm  
Production in this economy is undertaken by a firm that pays  and  in return for 
labor and capital respectively. The firm has a production function	 = ( , ). 
3.2.3. Financial Intermediary 
The Financial intermediary is assumed to be risk neutral with access to financial 
markets where they can borrow at risk free interest rate	( ).20 They issue simple 
mortgages to a homeowner at a discount rate ( ).21 The discount rate charged by the 
financial intermediary is not the same for all borrowers since ( ) is determined based on 
the probability of an agent’s default such that the intermediary’s expected profit is zero.   
                                                 
19 This assumes that the housing size is a proxy for the value of the house . 
20 No arbitrage condition implies that risk free interest rate and return on capital are the same. 
21 For simplicity reasons, simple mortgage contracts are assumed to be the only type of contracts available 
to agents. In addition, for purposes of assessing the effect of the deductibility of interest in mortgage 
payment on default rates, any other assumption on the type of contracts (adjustable rate mortgages for 
example) would produce more dramatic results. 
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3.2.4. Government 
The government levies taxes on labor and capital income ( ) and ( ) 
respectively. Government expenditure is constant and set at G every period. I restrict the 
government’s access to borrowing markets, so it runs a balanced budget, using tax 
revenues to finance its expenditures which do not affect individuals at the margin22. 
3.2.5. Tax System 
As mentioned previously, the government only has access to distortionary taxes. 
It taxes Labor income at rate (τ ) and capital income at rate	(τ ). Mortgage interest 
payments are tax deductible, and government does not tax imputed rents. This system 
replicates the tax system currently implemented in the U.S.   
When assessing the effect of the tax system on foreclosures, I change the 
assumptions on the tax regime such that mortgage interest payments are not tax 
deductible and government taxes imputed rents at rate	(τ ). 
3.2.6. Timing  
Households start every period with the amount of savings k decided the previous 
period. Their stochastic productivity for the period z is revealed and they make their 
consumption, housing, and savings decisions.  
A household entering the current period as a renter has the choice to either 
continue to rent or buy a house.  
                                                 
22 This is a standard assumption of the literature, see Gervais 2002 for example. 
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A household entering the current period as an owner can either pay her current 
mortgage payment or default. If she chooses to make the mortgage payment, she will 
continue to own her housing unit. If she defaults on her mortgage, she will lose her house 
and will be forced to rent. 
3.3. Equilibrium 
3.3.1. Household’s Problem 
3.3.1.1. Renters 
Renters choose how much to consume of the non-durable good , housing ℎ, and 






• (k′)	is	the	capital	savings	for	next	period	V(z′, k′)	is	the	value	function	for	entering	next	period	with	productivity	z and	savings	k′	and	deciding	whether	to	rent	or	buy	housing.	Thus:	
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( , ) = ( , ), ( , )  
3.3.1.2. Ownership Decision 
If an agent decides to buy a house this period, she chooses how much to consume 
of the non-durable good c, the size of house she will buy h, and how much to invest in 
capital k′. 
The value function of buying a house V is given by V (z, k) = Max ′, , ,U(c, h) + 	βE ′⁄ V z′, k′, 1, P(z, k, h)  s. t. c + k′ = w. z. (1 − τ ) + 	k. (1 − δ ) + r. k. (1 − τ ) − (1 − λ). h 
Where: 
• (1 − λ). h	is the down payment requirement for buying a house of size h. 
• V  is the value function of owning a house. The third state variable in V  (one in this case) represents the number of periods an agent has 
been in a mortgage contract.  
• (P)	is an index state variable representing the size of the house and the 
agent’s income and capital combination at which the house was 
purchased. Every combination of income, capital, and housing purchased 
leads to a specific probability of default that the intermediaries use to 
determine the discount rate they will charge, the mortgage payments M(P) 
and the interest paid every period I(P, O). 
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3.3.1.3. Owners 
An owner entering a period with an owned house of size (ℎ) and is in year ( ) of 
her mortgage can either pay the mortgage for that period or default on her loan. The 
decision whether to repay or default is such that the sum of expected future utility is 
maximized, thus the value function for owning is given by:  ( , , , ) = ( , , , ), ( , , 1)  
Where V (z, k, o, P) is the agent’s value of paying this period’s mortgage 
payment and remaining a homeowner and V (z, k, 1) is the agent’s value function of 
not paying this period’s mortgage payment and thus being in the first year of default. The 
repayment and default value functions are derived in the following sections. 
3.3.1.4. Repayment 
If a homeowner decides to pay her mortgage payment for the period, she will 
remain an owner for next period, and decide on her consumption  and savings	 ′′. The 
value function for repayment is  such that: ( , , , ) = ′, ( , ℎ) + 	 ′⁄ ( ′, ′, + 1, ) . . + ′ = . . (1 − ) + 	 . (1 − ) + . . (1 − ) − ( ) + ( , ).  
Where: 
• ( ) is the mortgage payment due every period,  
• ( , ) is the interest portion of the mortgage payment. This interest is tax 
deductible and hence it appears in the households budget constraint 
multiplied by the tax rate on labor income.  
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While the mortgage payment is fixed every period, the interest portion of the 
mortgage payment is decreasing with the number of periods ( )	for which the mortgage 
had been entered into. This is a result of the simple mortgage contracts which I assume 
are the only type of contract available to agents as discussed in section 2.3 above. 
Note here that the owner does not make a decision on housing size every period. 
The size of housing decision is made only when purchasing the house. 
3.3.1.5. Default 
If a homeowner decides not to pay her mortgage payment for the period and thus 
default, she will lose her house and will be forced to rent. The value function for 
defaulting in any given period  is such that: ( , , ) = ′, , , ( , ℎ) + 	 ′⁄ ( ′, ′, + 1) . . + ′ + . ℎ = . . (1 − ) + 	 . (1 − ) + . . (1 − ) 
Since an agent in default is forced to rent, her budget constraint is identical to that 
of a renter, and since that budget constraint is independent on the value of the owned 
house agent vacated, the default value function will be independent on the size of house 
(mortgage) being defaulted on. After defaulting this period, an agent is not allowed to 
buy own another house until after seven periods, that is until after	 = 7.  
Thus ( , , 7) = , , , ( , ℎ) + 	 ⁄ ( , ) . .		 + + . ℎ = . . (1 − ) + 	 . (1 − ) + . . (1 − ) 
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Where after seven periods from a default, the agent is allowed to own again, but 
also has the option to rent. Thus, the discounted future value function showing up in the 
definition of  ( , , 7) is	 ( ′, ′). 
Now that we have the value functions for a household’s different actions, we can derive 
the ownership and default sets. 
Ownership set ( ) is given by: ( , ) = , 	 . . ( , ) > ( , )  
And Default set ( ) is given by: ( , , , ) = , , , 	 . . ( , ) > ( , , , )  
3.3.2. Firm’s Problem 
The representative firm in this economy has a production function	Y = F(K, L). 
The firm pays agents wage w = F (K, L) and r = F (K, L)	in return for providing labor 
and capital respectively. 
3.3.3. Financial Intermediary’s problem  
Financial Intermediary provides mortgage contracts to agents purchasing a house. 
Intermediary determines interest rate to break even on expectation taking into account 
agent’s probability of default. Probability of default	Γ is a function of agent’s current 
income and capital savings as well as the size of the house being purchased and is given 
by: 
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Γ(z, k′, h) = f(z , z)dz′	  
Where f(z , z) is the probability density function of the stochastic labor 
productivity. In other words, probability of defaulting in the future on a house of size h 
given that current income is z and savings is k′ is the sum of probabilities of a z  being 
realized where (z , k′) belongs to the default set. 
The interest rate of a given mortgage defined by the triplet	(z, k′, h), is set by the 
financial intermediary so that, given the probability of default on the mortgage, it breaks 
even in expectation. Simple calculations implies that this interest rate (z, k′, h) is such 
that  
 ( , , ) = , ′, , ′, ( )	  
Where Γ( , , ℎ) is the probability of default determined above and  is the loss 
in value of a housing asset after a default. The above equation determines the interest rate 
to be charged by the intermediary as a risk adjusted rate based on the intermediary’s 
expected loss in case of default.   
3.4. Recursive Equilibrium 
Solving the household’s problem yields decision functions on consumption	Χ, 
savings	Δ, housing services	Σ, and ownership and default sets (Own) and (Def).  
A recursive equilibrium of the above model economy is defined by set of prices (r, w, q,M, I); value functions V, V , V , V , V , V ; decision rules 
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(Χ, Δ, Σ); ownership and default sets (	Own, Def); Probability of default function (Γ); and 
stationary distribution of agents (μ) such that : 
1. Given prices, the value functions V, V , V , V , V ,	V   
are the solution to the household’s optimization problem, Χ, Δ, Σ  are the 
resultant decision rules, and (Own), (Def) are the resultant ownership and 
default sets; 
2. r	and	w solve the firm’s optimization problem; 
3. Given Γ, q solves the financial intermediary problem; 
4. Government Budget constraint is satisfied; 
5. Labor and Capital markets clear; 
6. Given the decision rules, ownership, and default sets get the transition 
function T(z, k , o, e, P, F) s.t.  
μ(z, k , o, e, P, F) = T(z, k , o, e, P, F) dμ 
Where F differentiates whether an agent is an owner, a renter, or in 
default. 
Appendix III explains the algorithm used in arriving to the above equilibrium. 
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3.5. Parameterization and Calibration 
3.5.1. Parameterization 
For the productivity shocks dynamics, I use a first order 12 state Markov process 
previously used in Nakajima (2007).  
I use the following functional form of the period utility  ( , ℎ) = 1 −⁄ + ℎ 1 −⁄  
A linear transformation technology exists between house value and housing 
services	ℎ = ( ). Living in a house of value 	( ) will generate 	ℎ =  of housing 
services.23  
The firm is assumed to have a Cobb-Douglas production technology =
( ) where ( ) is the aggregate capital in the economy and ( ) is the aggregate 
labor. Thus, = (1 − ) ( ) and	 = ( ) ( ).  
3.5.2. Calibration A	and	ψ	are jointly calibrated to match the following data moments: capital share 
of total output, ownership rate in 2007, and default rates in 2007. 
For ξ, the decrease in value of the housing asset after default, I use data from the 
Case-Shiller Index on housing which approximates the decrease in same house prices to 
be 20% between December of 2007 and December of 2008.24  
                                                 
23 This assumption of linear transformation is used in Gervais (2002) and Nakajima (2007). 
24 Originally compiled and published by economists Karl Case, Robert Shiller, and Allan Weiss; the 
S&P/Case–Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index is a composite of single-family home price indices for 
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For the remaining parameters in the model, I use values previously used in the 
literature. Specifically for the discount factor β I use a value of 0.96, for the Cobb 
Douglas production function I use an	α of 0.28 and for the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion η, I use a value of 2. 
The results of the calibration were as follows 
Parameter Description Value A Production function coefficient 0.275 
 Weight of housing in utility function 0.183
25
 
Table 2: Results of Calibration. 
3.6. Results 
In this section, I present the results of the computation of the recursive 
equilibrium described above under the environment described in Section 2 – the 
“Baseline Model”.  
3.6.1. Size of Houses 
Figure 5 and 6 below show the sizes of rented and owned houses are increasing in 
both capital savings and income. This is an expected result as utility of households is 
increasing with the level of housing services consumed. Figure 5 plots the agent’s 
decision if she was to always rent, while figure 6 shows the agent’s decision if she was to 
                                                                                                                                                 
the nine U.S. Census divisions. Options and futures based on the Case–Shiller index are traded on the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
25 When calculating the results of this paper, I run a sensitivity analysis on this parameter where I increase 
the value of this parameter by 10%. 
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always own. The equilibrium size of house occupied (via both renting and owning) is 
shown in Figure 7 which also shows the increasing relationship between size of house 
occupied versus income and savings. 
   
Figure 5: Size of Rented house as a function of savings and income 

























Figure 6: Size of owned house as a function of savings and income 
 
 

























Figure 7: Size of agent’s housing (rented or owned) at equilibrium as a function of 
savings and income 
3.6.2. Ownership and Default Decision 
Ownership is increasing in capital savings and income as shown in Figure 8 and 
default is decreasing in income as shown in Figure 9. These figures show that as agent’s 
income increase not only they are more likely to own, but they are more likely to 
continue to own (i.e. not default).  

























Figure 8: Ownership decision as a function of savings income 

























3.6.3. Default Decision 
 
Figure 9: Default decision as a function of income 
3.7. Tax Reform 
To assess the effect of the preferential tax treatment of housing assets on defaults, 
I recalculate the foreclosure rate in the economy after adjusting for the preferential tax 
characteristics. In particular, I analyze the change in foreclosures when implicit rents 
from owner occupied housing are taxed and the change when interest in mortgage 
payments are not tax deductible. 
 I note here that the evaluation in this section is not concerned with the welfare 
implications of such tax reforms and thus does not comment on the optimality of these 
tax changes. The optimality of the tax code changes under a setup similar to the one 
described in this paper and in the literature in general would have to be performed while 
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keeping the government’s tax revenue constant.26 The suggested tax reform being 
evaluated in this paper relates to increasing tax revenue as well as overall market reform 
in relation to housing assets.  
Both changes to the tax code considered here will affect the equilibrium of the 
model in directionally similar ways. Implicit rent is the rent the home owners would have 
paid had they rented their house. Due to the no arbitrage condition, this rent is given by ℎ where h is the size of the house. Adjusting the tax code in the Baseline Model such 
that owners are taxed on this implicit income will lead to a reduction in the value of 
owning a house for all house sizes for all owners. That is, given that an agent is an owner, 
her ( , , , ) decreases for all values of 	 	 . Recall that  is the number of 
periods the mortgage has been entered into and  is the index variable that represents the 
triplet of income, saving and size of house purchased at the time the purchase decision is 
made. Similarly disallowing deduction of the interest portion of mortgage payments will 
lead to a decrease in ( , , , ) decreases for all values of	 	 	  for all owners. 
For obvious reasons, the reforms to the tax code do not apply to renters and thus the value 
function associated with an agent being a renter,	 ( , ), is unchanged.  
Given the discussion in the above paragraph, the value of buying a house, V (z, k), is a relatively less favorable option post implementation of the reforms 
                                                 
26 The literature assumes the condition on government’s tax revenue remaining constant when assessing the 
welfare implications of tax reform because individuals do not get marginal utility from government 
expenditure. Thus an increase in tax revenue and consequently increased government spending under the 
balanced budget assumption has no channel to contribute to the utility of agents.  
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compared to owning a house under the Baseline Model and thus the ownership rate will 
unambiguously fall due to both reforms.27 
The decrease in the ownership rate means that in equilibrium the economy will 
have fewer owners and thus fewer agents will have the option of defaulting which 
reduces the rate of foreclosure. On the other hand, since the value function of entering 
into default,	 ( , , 1), is independent of the size of the mortgage defaulted on 
(that is the size of the house owned at the time of the default), more owners will choose 
to default when comparing a decreasing ( , , , ) to a constant ( , , 1). 
So even though ownership rate can be analytically tracked to decrease as a result of the 
tax reforms, the net effect on foreclosure rates is ambiguous analytically and will depend 
on the computational results of the model.  
 The results of re-computing the Baseline Model with the changes described in 
this section are presented in Table 3 below. 
Tax Code Change Ownership Rate Foreclosure Rate 
Taxing imputed rents  
49.01 percent – Reduction of 
 30.7 percent from Baseline 
 Model 
4.04 percent - Reduction of 32.5 
4.05  percent from Baseline  
4.06 Model 
Interest mortgage  
payments not  
deductible 
68.44 percent – Reduction of 
3.2 percent from Baseline  
Model 
5.25 percent- Reduction of 12.4  
percent from Baseline Model 
Taxing imputed rents 
 and interest mortgage 
 payments not 
 deductible 
47.32 percent - Reduction of  
33.1 percent from Baseline  
Model 
3.99 percent- Reduction of 33.4  
percent from Baseline Model 
Table 3: Effect of changes to tax code28 
                                                 
27 Since V (z, k) includes the discounted value function of owning a house, ( , , , ), which in 
turn is determined by ( , , , ) and ( , , , )	is decreasing for all owners. 
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3.8. Conclusion 
I construct a recursive equilibrium model of consumption, housing, and tenure 
choice where agents default in equilibrium. I use my framework to test the effect of the 
current US housing tax regime on the foreclosure rate. The idea that the current tax 
regime incentivizes agents to over accumulate housing assets is not a new one, however 
the effect of this over accumulation on foreclosures is of interest especially after the 
recession of 2008. I investigate the effect of two tax reforms – taxing imputed rents and 
disallowing deductibility of interest in mortgage payments.  
The results of this paper indicate that the current tax regime leads to an ownership 
rate that is 30 percent higher than it would be under a tax regime that equates housing 
assets to other capital assets in the economy. In addition, the reforms discussed in this 




                                                                                                                                                 
28 Under the sensitivity analysis, the results are as follows: 
Taxing Imputed Rents: Ownership Rate = 49.13%  Default Rate= 3.96% 
Interest Mortgage Not Deductible: Ownership Rate = 70.01%  Default Rate= 5.6% 




Algorithm for Recursive Equilibrium – Chapter 1 
 
Following is the algorithm used to compute the recursive equilibrium describes in Section 
1.3.3 of Chapter 1.  
Given the set of calibrated parameter values, do the following: 
BEGIN 
Step 1: Initializations 
• Start with values for discount rate (q) and premiums (R) , call them q and	R respectively 
• Start with initial distribution of agents (Ω) , call it (Ω )  
• Start with a starting point for value functions (V, T) call them (V , T ) 
Step 2: Value Function Iterations 
Given current estimates of value functions (V , T ), discount rate ( ), premiums ( ), and 
agent distribution (Ω)  
Step 2.a: Solve for agents decision functions and calculate new estimates for 
value functions (V , T ) 
Step 2.b: Test for convergence of value function 
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• If value functions did not converge-i.e. if (V , T ) are different from (V , T ) - 
update value function estimates such that (V , T ) = (V , T 	) and repeat Step 
2  
• If value functions converged, continue to Step 3 
Step 3: Update distribution of agents 
Starting with current estimate of distribution of agents (Ω )  
Step 3.a: use optimal decision functions from Step 2 and transition processes for 
income and health states to calculate new estimate of agent distribution function (Ω ) ,  
Step 3.b: Test for convergence of distribution function 
• If distribution function did not converge-i.e. if (Ω ) is different from (Ω ) - 
update distribution function estimate such that (Ω ) = (Ω ) and repeat Step 3  
• If distribution function converged, continue to Step 4 
Step 4: Insurance market clearing 
Given estimates of optimal decision functions from Step 2 and estimate of stationary 
distribution of agents from Step 3 
Step 4.a: Calculate new premiums (R ) using the insurance provider’s zero profit 
condition. 
Step 4.b: convergence of premiums 
• If premiums did not converge-i.e. if (R ) is different from (R ) - update 
premium estimate such that (R ) = (R 	) and go back to Step 2  
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• If distribution function converged, continue to Step 5 
Step 5: Asset Market clearing  
Given the estimates of the value functions, optimal decision functions, and stationary 
agent distribution from Steps 2 and 4 above  
 Step 5.a: Calculate total asset holdings in the economy, call it (A) 
Step 5.b: Asset market clearing 
• if asset market does not clear – i.e. if (A ≠ 0)- adjust estimate of discount rate 
and go back to Step 2 above  
• if asset market clears – i.e. if (A = 0) - END 
Once the algorithm describes above exists Step 5, all the recursive equilibrium conditions 
described in section 1.3.3 above would be met.   
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APPENDIX II 
Proofs – Chapter 2 
Proposition 1: Under an indemnity regime, insurance premium  is such that the 
expected utility of an insured agent is equal to the expected utility of an uninsured agent  =  
Proof 
The insurance provider’s problem is given by  Max 	R − 	γ	Q , . (1 − σ) P  s. t. (γ). U C , , , Q , + 	(1 − γ). U C , , , 0≥ (γ). U C , , , Q , + 	(1 − γ). U C , , , 0 ⋯ (IC − 1) 
The insurance provider takes price set by the care provider as given and under the 
separating equilibrium where the percentage of insured agents is constant and equal to the 
percentage of high type individuals in the economy. 
The insurance provider’s profit is given by  ∂Π∂R = 1 − , (1 − )  
Demand for medical care is decreasing in premium R , i.e. , <
0. So insurance provider’s profit is increasing in premium	R ,that is		 >
0. 
The right hand side of IC − 1, expected utility of uninsured agents is independent 
of R, while the left hand side of IC − 1 is decreasing in R. Thus for the profit maximizing 
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insurance provider, IC − 1	is	binding	and	R	is	such	that	 EU =EU . ∎  
Proposition 2: − 3 is binding if demand is elastic or if demand is inelastic and 
is larger than marginal cost. i.e. = ⋯⋯⋯(8) 	 , < −1		⋯⋯⋯ 	(1) 
	 	 , 	 ≥ −1	&	 < ∅ 	⋯⋯⋯ 	(2) 
Proof 
 The insurance provider’s problem under managed care is given by  Max , 	Π = Max , 	R − 	γ	Q 	(1 − σ)(P ). s. t. (γ). U C , , , Q , +	(1 − γ). U C , , , 0 − (γ). U C , , , Q ,+ 	(1 − γ). U C , , , 0 ≥ 0⋯(IC − 3) 
and (τ) P Q , − ∅ Q , ≥ 0⋯ (IC − 5) 
Proposition 2 can be shown by deriving partial derivatives as follows:  
• = 1 − 	 	 	(1 − )( ) > 0 
• ( ) = (γ). , , , , + 	 (1 − γ). 	 , , , < 0	
• ( ) = (τ) P − ∅ , 		
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o Since	 , < 0,	 ( ) > 0	if	 < ∅ 
• = −	γ	(1 − σ) Q + P =
−γ	(1 − σ)(Q ) 1 + ε , 		
o < 0	if	ε , > −1	
o > 0	if	ε , < −1	
• ( ) = (γ). , , , , + 	 (1 − γ). 	 , , , < 0	
• ( ) = (τ) Q , 1 + ε , − ∅ , 	
o ( ) > 0	ifε , > 	 ∅ , − 1	
o ( ) < 0	ifε , < 	 ∅ , − 1	
Based on the conditions derived above, we can construct the following matrix 
along with effect on the incentive compatibility constraints. 
 , < ∅ , −  ∅ , − < , <-1 -1< , <0 < ∅ IC-3 binds IC-5 may or may not bind IC-3 Binds IC-5 Doesn’t bind IC-3 Binds IC-5 Binds > ∅ IC-3 binds or IC-5 binds or both bind IC-3 Binds IC-5 May or may not bind IC-3 May/May not Bind 
IC-5: Binds 
Table A1: Summary of Conditions 
To prove the conclusions in Table A.1 above, let us start with the case of -
1< ε , <0 and P < ∅ and show that the solution to the insurance problem is such 
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that IC-3 and IC-5 both bind. Under the specific conditions on ε ,  and P  in this case, 
the following holds: 
• > 0 , ( ) < 0 , ( ) > 0 and 
• < 0	,	 ( ) < 0	,	 ( ) > 0	
Assume that the pair (R∗, P∗ ) is a solution to the insurance provider problem 
such that IC-3 is not binding. Then given the inequalities stated above, there exists a 
premium R > R∗ such that IC-3 binds, IC-5 is not violated, and Π (R , P∗ ) >Π (R∗, P∗ ). Then	(R∗, P∗ ) cannot be a solution to the insurance maximization 
problem. So for a pair R , P 	to be a solution, IC-3 must bind.  
Now assume that (R∗∗, P∗∗ ) is a solution to the insurance provider problem such 
that IC-5 is not binding. Then given the inequalities stated above, there exists a price P < P∗∗  such that IC-5 binds in	P , IC-3 is not violated, and Π (R∗∗, P ) > Π (R∗∗, P∗∗ ). Then	(R∗∗, P∗∗ ) cannot be a solution to the 
insurance maximization problem. So for a pair R , P 	to be a solution, IC-5 must 
bind.  
Hence if 0< ε , <-1 and P < ∅ the solution to the insurance problem is a 
pair of prices R , P  such that both IC-3 and IC-5 are binding. 
Using an approach similar to the above, we can prove the other conclusions in 
Table A.1. 
Combining the conclusions of Table A.1, proves proposition 2.	∎ 
 67
 
Proposition 3: Under Managed Care, uninsured agents pay more for medical 
care,	 ≥ , when compared to the Indemnity regime if the elasticity of 
demand is such that	 , ≤ ∅, , − 1… . ( 	3) 
Proof 
Equations 5 and 7 above are the F.O.C. for the care provider under the Indemnity 
and managed care regimes respectively and are repeated here for convenience 
, + 	 , − ∅, , + 	(1 − ) , + 	 , − ∅ , ,= 0						 ⋯⋯⋯(5) 
(1 − ) , +	 , − ∅ , , = 0	⋯⋯⋯(7) 
Evaluating the indemnity F.O.C. at the solution to the care provider’s problem 
under managed care ∗  gives us  	 ∗ = , + 	 , − ∅, , ∗ = 0⋯⋯⋯(9) 
Where the second term in the equation above is zero as in equation (7).  
The sign of 
	 ∗  determines the relationship between price under 
indemnity, , and the price paid by the uninsured under managed care,	 ∗ .  
In specific if 
	 ∗ > 0 then ∗ <  and if 	 ∗ < 0 then 
∗ > .  
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Keeping in mind that	 = , deriving proposition 3 is straightforward 




Algorithm for Recursive Equilibrium – Chapter 3 
Following is the algorithm used to compute the recursive equilibrium describes in 
Section 3.4 of Chapter 3.  
Given the set of calibrated parameter values, do the following: 
BEGIN 
Step 1: Initializations 
• Start with initial values for prices (r, w, q,M, I) call them (r , w , q ,M , I ) 
• Start with initial distribution of agents (μ) call it (μ ) 
• Start with initial values for value functions V, V , V , V , V , V  call them V , V , V , V , V , V  
Step 2: Value Function Iterations 
Given current estimates of value functions, prices, and agent distribution function  
Step 2.a: Solve for agents decision functions and calculate new estimates for all 
value functions V , V , V , V , V , V  
Step 2.b: Test for convergence of value functions 
• If value functions did not converge-i.e. if V , V , V , V , V , V ≠
(V , V , V , V , V , V ) – equate starting estimate to new estimate and 
repeat Step 2  
• If value functions converged, continue to Step 3 
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Step 2.c: Update probability of default (Γ)and ownership and default sets (Own, Def) 
Step 3: Update distribution of agents 
Starting with current estimate of distribution of agents ( ) 
Step 3.a: use optimal decision functions, the probability of default function, and 
ownership and default sets from Step 2 as well as transition processes for income 
to calculate new estimate of agent distribution function ( ) ,  
Step 3.b: Test for convergence of distribution function 
• If distribution function did not converge-i.e. if ( ≠ )- update distribution 
function estimate such that ( = )and repeat Step 3  
• If distribution function converged, continue to Step 4 
Step 4: Labor and Capital Markets Clearing 
Given optimal decision functions from Step 2 and stationary distribution of agents from 
Step 3 
Step 4.a: Calculate total capital and total labor in the economy and use them to 
calculate updated prices (r , w ) 
Step 4.b: Capital and Labor Market clearing 
• if Capital Market or Labor Market does not clear – i.e. if (r ≠ r )	or	(w ≠w ) - adjust value of total capital and/or total labor and go back to Step 2  
• if asset market clears – i.e. if (r = r )	AND	(w = w ) - END 
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Once the Algorithm describes above exists Step 4, all the recursive equilibrium 
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